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Abstract: We identified a notable lack of academic literature on the issue of third-country auditors 
and the main contribution of our article is to address this gap. This research builds on 
adjacent audit oversight and capital markets literature and we extend this literature by 
providing evidence on third-country auditors. Specifically, we test the relationship between 
market capitalization and number of foreign IPOs of listed companies in representative 
EU countries (on one hand) and the existence of third-country auditors in those respective 
countries (on the other hand). Our research was performed in the second half of 2018 and 
is based on the latest data available. We have found that there are about 200 third-country 
auditors present in the public registers of audit oversight bodies in 11 EU countries. Ac-
cording to our network analysis, only European countries with a developed capital market 
have attracted third-country auditors. Most of the relationships of these developed EU 
capital markets are nurtured with non-EU capital markets that are at the same level of 
development (e.g. USA, Switzerland, Canada, Israel, and Australia). Our research hypoth-
eses were validated: (1) the higher the market capitalization of a EU country, the higher 
the likelihood for the registration of third-country auditors; (2) the higher the number of 
foreign IPOs relative to the total IPOs on the stock exchange market, the higher the likeli-
hood for the registration of third-country auditors.
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Introduction 
There is a growing argument in favour of an improved public oversight system for 
statutory auditors across the European Union (EU). In line with the neo-institutional 
theory which claims that changes in institutional systems are the result of external 
events (Bengtsson 2011), the demand for such reforms of the public oversight sys-
tem for statutory auditors in the EU has been triggered in the last two decades by 
the string of resounding financial scandals, starting with cases such as Worldcom, 
Parmalat and culminating with the demise of Enron and its auditor Arthur Ander-
sen in early 2000s. As a consequence of these scandals and the negative impact on 
capital markets, there was a loss of confidence in auditors and the audit process, 
with investors and other stakeholders questioning the role of the auditors. The de-
mand for institutional change at audit oversight level continued to surge, fuelled by 
the financial crisis of 2008 and the more recent resounding accounting scandals in 
various European countries. A good example of concern at a business, public and 
even political level is the powerful impact case of the collapse of Carillion in the 
UK in February 2018 where the auditors, one of the Big 4 accounting firms, issued a 
clean audit report months before the collapse of the firm. Auditors in the EU but also 
around the world are increasingly questioned on the value of their work and the over-
sight system for statutory audits would naturally play an important role in mitigating 
the concerns of the public and perhaps helping to close the audit expectation gap. A 
significant development in the oversight of the EU audit market came in 2006 when 
the European Commission issued Directive 2006/43/EC (the Directive, hereafter) 
amended in 2014 by Directive 2014/56/EU (the Statutory Audit Directive), in which 
member states are required to organize a public oversight institution which would 
be responsible for regulating, supervising and disciplining statutory auditors. Part of 
this initiative was the regulation and oversight of non-EU auditors that were auditing 
the financial statements of non-EU companies listed on EU capital markets. This is 
a niche but important subject that has hardly been given any attention before. This 
article explores this unchartered territory and is structured as follows. First, a litera-
ture review is made. Second, the research design is presented and described in detail. 
The third section presents the research results, while the final section summarizes 
the findings of the study.
Literature review and research hypotheses
The roots of the need to improve the oversight system for statutory audits are found in 
the interrelationship between capital markets, listed entities and statutory audits. Rec-
ognising the role of the statutory audits and their stakeholder-interest function coupled 
with the heterogeneity that existed in the public oversight of audits among member 
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states (Van Tenderloo and Vanstraelen 2008; Maijoor and Vanstraelen 2012), the EU 
aimed to harmonize the audit oversight system in a drive to increase audit quality in 
its jurisdiction. In this positive endeavour, the EU has issued Directive 2006/43/EC 
amended in 2014 by Directive 2014/56/EU, in which member states are required to or-
ganize a public oversight institution which would be responsible for regulating, super-
vising and disciplining statutory auditors. This Directive aims at high-level, though 
not full, harmonisation of statutory audit requirements and recognises that the pub-
lic-interest function of statutory auditors means that a broader community of people 
and institutions rely on the quality of a statutory auditor’s work. However, in a recent 
study, Garcia Osma, Gisbert and de las Heras Cristobal (2017) find that despite having 
an EU Directive that requires the harmonization of the audit oversight systems, some 
of the characteristics of the pre-Directive systems perpetuated into the current system 
and the authors argue that additional supra-national efforts are required to truly har-
monize the supervisory procedures of the audit profession in Europe.
Good audit quality contributes to the orderly functioning of markets by enhancing 
the integrity and efficiency of financial statements. To this end, one of the merits of the 
Directive 2006/43/EC is the provision of regulation for the treatment of third-coun-
try auditors. The Directive clearly emphasized the need to ensure high-quality work 
performed by auditors from third countries with respect to the EU capital markets, as 
well as the need for transparency on the audit market in this respect, with the purpose 
that the interest of investors for Community capital markets is not deterred. To the 
best of our knowledge, no empirical research has been carried out so far on the spe-
cific topic of third-country auditors (TCAs). This article will explore the relationship 
between third-country auditors and representative EU capital markets with the aim 
to better grasp its dynamics. 
According to the Directive 2006/43/EC, a ‛third-country audit entity’ means an 
entity, regardless of its legal form, which carries out audits of the annual or consol-
idated accounts of a company incorporated in a third country (i.e. a country other 
than an EU or EEA country). Third-country auditors are auditors of non-EU incor-
porated companies that have issued securities on EU regulated markets. Article 45 of 
the Statutory Audit Directive sets out the regulatory requirements for the registration 
and oversight of third country auditors, including the external monitoring of audit 
quality and mechanisms for investigations and sanctions. Article 46 of the Statutory 
Audit Directive allows member states to derogate from the requirements of Article 45 
where the third country auditor is subject to a system of public oversight, inspections 
and investigations which the European Commission has recognised as equivalent, or 
where the third country auditor is within transitional arrangements adopted by the 
European Commission. At the time of writing, the concept of third-country auditors 
has not been widely used in practice or academic circles but is of high importance 
for the good functioning of capital markets and the confidence of present or potential 
investors as users of those markets. 
74 Mihaela Mocanu, Octavian Iancu Ionescu
There is a notable lack of previous academic research in the area of third-country 
auditors. The changes imposed first by the Directive 2006/43/EC, and afterwards by 
the Statutory Audit Directive have triggered a great amount of research, but none of 
the papers focus on the topic of TCAs. More recently, there are papers that briefly 
discuss the major regulatory innovations in the EU relating to auditing and provide 
general ideas for future research driven by the Statutory Audit Directive (such as Af-
terman, 2016; Köhler, Quick, Willekens, 2016; ). Other studies focus on the implica-
tions of the new audit framework for the provision of non-audit services (Holm, 2016; 
Ratzinger-Sakel & Schönberger, 2015). Some studies explore the potential benefits 
and costs of the recent audit reforms, such as Kend and Basioudis (2017) who obtain 
the views of UK-relevant stakeholders on this matter, while Duhovnik (2016) points 
out problems that could arise in a small European country with just a few public 
interest entities and a weak audit market. An extensive study of Horton, Tsipouridou 
and Wood (2018) demonstrates a positive reaction of investors to the proposed EU 
audit reforms, lifting the aggregate market value by approximately €108,630 million. 
On a similar note as our research, a connection between the changes on the European 
auditing market and their potential impact on countries from another area (namely 
the United States) is made by Afterman (2016).
Our research contributes towards filling in this literature gap and offering insight 
into the current status of third-country auditors, in the context of the interrelation 
of capital markets worldwide and on the background of the recent Statutory Audit 
Directive. The objective of our research is twofold: (1) to create a picture of the in-
terrelation of capital markets, as proxied by the existence of third-country auditors 
registered in Community countries; (2) to identify determinants of the existence of 
third-country auditors. Our research hypotheses are the following:
H1: There is a direct positive correlation between a country’s market capitaliza-
tion of listed domestic companies (% of GDP) and the existence of third-country 
auditors registered in that particular EU country. 
H2: There is a direct positive correlation between the percentage of foreign 
IPOs in the total IPOs listed on the country’s stock exchange and the existence of 
third-country auditors registered in that particular EU country.
Research design
For each of the current 28 countries of the European Union, we have accessed the 
public register of the statutory audit companies and we have identified the third-coun-
try auditors (TCAs) registered in that particular country. The data that was relevant 
for our study was the number of TCAs in each EU country and the countries of origin 
for each of the TCAs. We have only collected data on registered audit companies, and 
not individuals acting as registered auditors. 
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For the purpose of testing the correlation between different factors and the ex-
istence of TCAs in a certain EU country, we have applied the biserial correlation 
coefficient, which is appropriate to measure the relationship between one continuous 
variable and one binary variable. We have defined the binary (dummy) variable, as 
follows: 1 if there is at least one registered TCA in that EU country; 0 if no TCAs are 
registered in that EU country. Regarding the continuous variable, we have used (1) 
the market capitalization as percentage of GDP as at the year end of 2017; and (2) the 
percentage of foreign IPOs in the total IPOs listed on the EU markets during a 5-year 
period (2013-2017). To double-check the results and obtain a p-value, we have run a 
Pearson correlation test, too. 
The value of the indicator ‛market capitalization of listed domestic companies 
(% of GDP)’ was extracted from the statistics published by the World Bank as at the 
year-end 2017, whereas the data source regarding the foreign IPOs on the European 
Union markets was the annual statistics published by the Federation of European 
Securities Exchange (FESE) for their members. 
Regarding both the European Union countries where TCAs are registered and the 
TCAs’ countries of residence, we have reduced the granularity of data by applying 
the Russell FTSE classification of equity markets, which comprises four main cate-
gories: Developed, Advanced Emerging, Secondary Emerging, and Frontier. Out of 
28 EU countries, only 11 countries have third-country auditors registered. The coun-
tries where the TCAs reside and were part of the analysis amount to 39. 
Based on these data, a social network analysis has been performed. The incidence 
matrix had 11 rows (number of EU countries with TCAs – X) and 39 columns (num-
ber of countries where TCAs reside – Y). We considered that there is a tie between 
two countries if a country from the X array registered an auditor from the Y array. 
Self-ties have been excluded. 
Results 
Out of 28 EU countries, only 11 countries have third-country auditors registered, 
respectively: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Lux-
embourg, Netherlands, Spain, and United Kingdom. Table 1 shows the number of 
third-country auditors and their weight in the total of 211 third-country auditors. The 
top three countries are United Kingdom (with 116 registered TCAs, accounting for 
more than half of the total existing third-country auditors in the European Union); 
Luxembourg (with 31 registered TCAs, accounting for 15%) and France (with 17 
TCAs, accounting for merely 8%). 
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Table 1: Number of third-country audit entities across the EU
No. Country No. of third-country auditors Weight
1 United Kingdom 116 55%
2 Luxembourg 31 15%
3 France 17 8%
4 Germany 10 5%
5 Netherlands 10 5%
6 Ireland 8 4%
7 Belgium 7 3%
8 Italy 7 3%
9 Denmark 3 1%
10 Austria 1 0%
11 Spain 1 0%
Total 211 100%
Source: author-collected data 
Table 2 displays the countries where TCAs reside, along with the number of TCAs 
and their weight. Most of the third-country auditors have originated from USA (33 
TCAs), Switzerland (18 TCAs), Canada (11 TCAs) and Israel (11 TCAs), between 
them making up 35% of the total 211 third-country auditors registered in all EU 
countries. Australia and Russia follow, each having 10 TCAs present in different 
European countries.
Table 2: Countries where TCAs reside







1 USA 33 16% 13 Bermuda 4 2%
2 Switzerland 18 9% 14 Brazil 4 2%
3 Canada 11 5% 15 Egypt 4 2%
4 Israel 11 5% 16 Lebanon 4 2%
5 Australia 10 5% 17 United Arab Emirates 4 2%
6 Russia 10 5% 18 Cayman Islands 3 1%
7 South Africa 9 4% 19 Georgia 3 1%
8 Japan 7 3% 20 Hong Kong 3 1%
9 Kazakhstan 7 3% 21 India 3 1%
10 Korea (Republic of) 7 3% 22 Morocco 3 1%
11 China 5 2% 23 New Zealand 3 1%
12 Turkey 5 2% 24 Nigeria 3 1%
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25 Singapore 3 1% 37 Barbados 1 0%
26 Tunisia 3 1% 38 Faroe Islands 1 0%
27 Zimbabwe 3 1% 39 Indonesia 1 0%
28 Argentina 2 1% 40 Isle of Man 1 0%
29 Bahrain 2 1% 41 Jersey (UK) 1 0%
30 Chile 2 1% 42 Jordan 1 0%
31 Curaçao (Netherlands) 2 1% 43 Kenya 1 0%
32 Oman 2 1% 44 Malaysia 1 0%
33 Pakistan 2 1% 45 Mauritius 1 0%
34 Taiwan 2 1% 46 Philippines 1 0%
35 Azerbaijan 1 0% 47 Qatar 1 0%
36 Bahamas 1 0% 48 Vietnam 1 0%
Source: author-collected data 
The resulting incidence matrix is a directed rectangular (asymmetrical) matrix 
and this is why most of the network analysis indicators are not applicable. We have 
partitioned the initial incidence matrix. The purpose was to obtain a more clear dis-
play of the various connections between capital markets on global level. Tables 3 
displays the block density matrixes comprising the relative values (proportion of ties 
in a block).  Interesting to note is that only EU countries that have their capital mar-
ket classified by FESE in the category ‛Developed’ have registered TCAs, while at 
the same time, most of the countries of origin for the TCAs belong also to the group 
‛Developed’. The average density is 0.0448. 




Developed 0.3333 0.1667 0.1091 0.1074
Advanced Emerging 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Secondary Emerging 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Frontier 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Source: authors’ design 
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Source: authors’ design 
The result of the biserial correlation between market capitalization as percentage 
of GDP and the (non-)existence of third-country auditors is of 0.701541. This coef-
ficient indicates a relatively strong positive correlation. The result is also supported 
by the Pearson correlation test, in which case the coefficient was 0.5689287 and the 
p-value of 0.002999 was extremely low. Our first hypothesis was validated and we 
conclude that the higher the market capitalization of an EU country, the higher the 
likelihood for the registration of third-country auditors. 
The result of the biserial correlation between the percentage of foreign IPOs in 
the total IPOs on an EU capital market and the (non-)existence of third-country audi-
tors is 0.425236. This coefficient indicates a medium positive correlation between the 
two variables. The result is also supported by the Pearson correlation test, where the 
correlation coefficient was 0.7916521 and the p-value of 0.001261 was extremely low. 
Our second hypothesis was validated and we conclude that the higher the number of 
foreign IPOs relative to the total IPOs on the stock exchange market, the higher the 
likelihood of finding registered third-country auditors in the country of that stock 
exchange.
Conclusion
The role of the statutory audits in protecting stakeholder interests and consolidating 
trust in capital markets was openly recognised by European Union representatives, 
which made continuous efforts to harmonize the audit oversight system and to pro-
mote transparency on the audit market. Both the Directive 2006/43/EC and the new 
Statutory Audit Directive 2014/56/EU acknowledge the need to ensure high-quality 
work performed by auditors from third countries with respect to the EU capital mar-
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kets. Their provisions require transparency on the audit market in this matter, with 
the purpose to maintain the attractiveness of Community equity markets in the eyes 
of potential non-EU investors. Our research brings evidence that the desideratum of 
transparency and increased audit oversight was achieved in what the third-country 
auditors are concerned. The mere existence of third-country auditors is a proof of 
the interrelation of capital markets worldwide. Currently, there are 211 third-country 
auditors present in the public registers of audit oversight bodies in 11 EU countries. 
Our findings indicate that only European countries that have a developed capital 
market (as defined by the Federation of European Securities Exchange) have attract-
ed third-country auditors. Most of the relationships of these developed EU capital 
markets are nurtured with non-EU capital markets that are at the same level of de-
velopment. Thus, most of the third-country auditors originate from other developed 
capital markets: USA (33 TCAs), Switzerland (18 TCAs), Canada (11 TCAs), Israel 
(11 TCAs), and Australia (10 TCAs). Moreover, our research results suggest there 
is a strong positive correlation between the market capitalization of an EU country 
and the likelihood for the registration of third-country auditors in that particular 
Member State. Additionally, research shows that the higher the number of foreign 
IPOs relative to the total IPOs on a particular EU stock exchange market, the higher 
the likelihood for the registration of third-country auditors there. These results are 
in accordance with our expectations derived from the existent body of research and 
current debates among practitioners and legislators. The figures add up evidence on 
the current interrelation of capital markets worldwide and reinforce the need for pub-
lic oversight and transparency on the audit market. 
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